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Abstract. We introduce a new cryptographic primitive named threshold trapdoor functions (TTDFs),
from which we give generic constructions of threshold and revocation encryptions under adaptive
corruption model. Then, we show TTDFs can be instantiated under the decisional Diffie-Hellman
(DDH) assumption and the learning with errors (LWE) assumption. By combining the instanti-
ations of TTDFs with the generic constructions, we obtain threshold and revocation encryptions
which compare favorably over existing schemes. The experimental results show that our proposed
schemes are practical.
1 Introduction
Threshold public-key encryption. TPKE [1,2,3,4] can distribute the decryption power
among many servers in order to ensure threshold servers can decrypt ciphertexts, while any
probabilistic polynomial-time (PPT) adversary corrupting less than threshold servers is unable
to obtain the message. TPKE itself provides useful functionalities, and it is also a significant
building block in other cryptographic primitives, such as mix-net (anonymous channel) [5],
public key encryption with non-interactive opening [6,7].Generally speaking, a (n, t)-TPKE
scheme consists of a combiner and n decryption servers. The combiner sends the ciphertext to
all servers, any subset of t servers compute the decryption shares and reply, and the combiner
combines the replies to obtain the plaintext. However, in the securty model of TPKE, not only
the servers may be corrupted, but also the decryption shares could be eavesdropped. Therefore,
constructing TPKE schemes by splitting the secret key of public-key encrytion (PKE) directly
does not work. Following the generic construction of PKE from trapdoor function (TDF), we
try to design a threshold version of TDF for constructing the TPKE scheme, by splitting the
master trapdoor into n shares and storing each share on a different server and any subset of t
servers can use the shared trapdoors to invert the function, without reconstructing the master
trapdoor.
Revocation public-key encryption. RPKE [8,10,9] enables a sender to broadcast cipher-
texts and all but some revoked users can do the decryption. It is a special kind of broadcast
encryption [11] which enables a sender to encrypt messages and transmit ciphertexts to users
on a broadcast channel in order to the chosen users can decrypt ciphertexts. RPKE has many
applications, including pay-TV systems, streaming audio/video and many others.
Naor and Pinkas [8] considered the revocation scenario: a group controller (GC) controls the
decryption capabilities of users. If a subgroup of users is disallowed to do the decryption, the
GC needs to generate a new key which should be known to other users and be used to encrypt
in the further group communication. We observe that the threshold version of TDF remains
one-way, even if exposing part of shared trapdoors. Therefore, we can revoke this part of shared
trapdoors and ensure that any revoked users cannot decrypt the ciphertext.
1.1 Related Work
Designing generic construction of TPKE has proved to be a highly non-trivial task. Dodis and
Katz [12] gave a generic construction of TPKE from multiple encryption technique. Wee [9]
introduced a new primitive called threshold extractable hash proofs and presented a generic
construction of TPKE from it. However, both of above constructions are only secure under the
static corruption model where the adversary can corrupt the servers before the scheme is set up.
Following the work of Wee [9], Libert and Yung [13] introduced a primitive named all-but-one
perfectly sound threshold hash proof systems, from which they gave a generic construction of
TPKE under adaptive corruption model where the adversary can corrupt the servers at any
time. The results are important since the adaptive adversary is strictly stronger than the static
one [14,15]. But they only showed concrete instantiations under number-theoretic assumptions
in bilinear groups which are vulnerable to quantum attacks. Recently, lattices have been rec-
ognized as a viable foundation for quantum-resistant cryptography. Bendlin and Damg˚ard [16]
gave the first lattice-based TPKE based on a variant of Regev’s scheme [17]. Xie et al. [18]
designed the first chosen-ciphertext secure (IND-CCA) TPKE based on the LWE assumption.
However, both of above TPKEs are only statically secure, and the size of the public key and
the ciphertext is at least linear in the number of servers. Bendlin et al. [19] converted Identity
Based Encryption (IBE) [20] into threshold one, which can be transformed into a TPKE via
the generic transformation in [21]. However, in an offline phase, their scheme needs the parties
to perform lots of interactive precomputation. In summary, the state-of-the-art TPKE is not
entirely satisfactory. On one hand, existing generic constructions of TPKE are designed in the
limited static corruption model which fails to capture realistic attacks. On the other hand, most
existing TPKE schemes are based on number-theoretic assumptions which are insecure against
quantum attacks.
As for RPKE, Naor and Pinkas [8] considered a revocation scenario with a group controller
and constructed a RPKE scheme under the DDH assumption. Unlike the scenario of [8], Dodis
and Fazio [10] designed a RPKE in which every user who knows the revoked identities can
encrypt messages and every non-revoked user can decrypt ciphertexts. Then, they constructed
IND-CCA RPKE under the DDH assumption. Wee [9] presented a generic construction of RPKE
in static corruption model and instantiated the construction under the DDH assumption and
factoring assumption respectively. However, all of aforementioned schemes are designed under
the number-theoretic assumptions which are insecure against quantum attack.
1.2 Motivations
A central goal in cryptography is to construct cryptosystems in strong security models which
can resist lots of possible attacks. Another goal is to build cryptosystems under intractability
assumptions which are as general as possible; in this way, we can replace the underlying assump-
tion, if some assumption is vulnerable to a new attack or if another yields better performance.
Therefore, generic constructions of TPKE and RPKE in stronger adaptive corruption model are
advantageous. Meanwhile, with the development of quantum computer, designing the quantum-
resistant TPKE and RPKE is also necessary. Last but not least, constructing cryptosystems
based on the same cryptographic primitive brings additional advantages such as reducing the
footprint of cryptographic code and easily embedding into systems.
Motivated by above discussions, we ask the following challenging questions:
Can we construct TPKE and RPKE under adaptive corruption model from one cryp-
tographic primitive? Can we instantiate this primitive based on quantum-resistant as-
sumptions?
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1.3 Our Contributions
We introduce a cryptographic primitive named TTDF, and derive generic constructions of
TPKE and RPKE under adaptive corruption model from it. Along the way to instantiate
TTDF, we propose a notion called threshold lossy trapdoor function (TLTDF) and prove that
TTDF is implied by TLTDF, while the latter can be instantiated based on the DDH assumption
and the LWE assumption. Moreover, we show a relaxation of TTDF called threshold trapdoor
relation (TTDR), which enables the same applications of TPKE and RPKE, and admits more
efficient instantiation based on the DDH assumption. An overview of our contributions is given
in Figure 1.
TTDF TTDR
TPKE RPKE
TLTDF TLTDR
LWE DDH
Sec. 7.2 Sec. 7.1 Sec. 8
Sec. 6
Sec. 8
Sec. 8
Sec. 8
Sec. 4 Sec. 5
Fig. 1. Overview of the results in this work.
Threshold Trapdoor Function. Informally, TTDF is a threshold version of trapdoor func-
tion. It is parameterized by the threshold value t and the number of identities n. (n, t)-TTDF
splits the master trapdoor into n shared trapdoors. Every shared trapdoor can be used to com-
pute a piece of inversion share. Then, by collecting more than t inversion shares, the combiner
can recover the preimage. Especially, it can even compute inversion shares of any other iden-
tity with the help of the preimage. We formalize security notion for TTDF, namely threshold
one-wayness, which requires that the function remains one-way even when the adversary can
adaptively obtain less than t shared trapdoors.
TPKE and RPKE from TTDF. (n, t)-TTDF gives rise to a simple construction of (n, t)-
TPKE and (n, t − 1)-RPKE. The main idea of constructing (n, t)-TPKE follows constructing
public-key encryption from trapdoor function. In particular, the sharing algorithm splits the
master secret key into n shared secret keys, every shared secret key can be used to compute a
piece of inversion share, and collecting at least t inversion shares can extracts message. For the
security, TTDF holds threshold one-wayness which prevents any PPT adversary who can obtain
less than t shared secret keys from decrypting ciphertext, especially under adaptive corruption
model. Generally speaking, an adaptive adversary can make the decision of which parties to
corrupt at any time during the run of the scheme, in particular, based on the information like the
shared trapdoors of corrupted parties gathered. Providing this information is typically the main
difficulty in proving adaptive security [22]. TTDF holds a shared trapdoor oracle that given an
input of any identity, and outputs a shared trapdoor of this identity. Any PPT adversary can
get the information of any corrupted parties by querying the oracle adaptively and obtains at
most t− 1 shared trapdoors.
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Following the idea of constructing (n, t)-TPKE, we observes that (n, t)-TPKE holds the
security even if exposing t−1 shared secret keys. Therefore, the GC can revoke any t−1 identities
by encrypting a new session key and exposing their decryption shares. Every non-revoked user
can compute a decryption share and extracts the new session key. Moreover, threshold one-
wayness ensures that no PPT adversary can decrypt ciphertext without the non-revoked secret
key.
Instantiation. Along the way to instantiate TTDF, we introduce a new notion called TLTDF,
which is a threshold version of lossy trapdoor function (LTDF) [23]. It is parameterized by
the threshold value t and the number of identities n. Informally, LTDF has two modes. In
the injective mode, it is an injective trapdoor function. In the lossy mode, it statistically loses
an amount of information about the input. Both of the modes of LTDF are computationally
indistinguishable. However, in both modes of TLTDF, the master trapdoor can be split into n
shared trapdoors and every shared trapdoor can be used to compute an inversion share, and in
the injective mode any t inversion shares can be used to retrieve the preimage. Moreover, any
PPT adversary cannot distinguish both modes, even when the adversary can adaptively obtain
less than t shared trapdoors.
We prove that TTDF is implied by TLTDF and instantiate TLTDF under the DDH assump-
tion and the LWE assumption respectively. DDH-based TLTDF is easy to design, while building
LWE-based TLTDF is a non-trivial task. Intuitively, we transform the inversion algorithm of
LTDF into threshold version by using (n, t)-threshold secret sharing scheme [24]. Every user
gets a shared trapdoor tdi, i ∈ [n], and computes the inversion share 〈a, tdi〉 + ei. Then the
combiner obtains t inversion shares to compute the Lagrangian coefficients Li for any identity
set of size t and recombines the 〈a, td〉 by computing
L1(〈a, td1〉+ e1) + · · ·+ Lt(〈a, tdt〉+ et) = 〈a,
t∑
i=1
Li · tdi〉+
t∑
i=1
Li · ei
= 〈a, td〉+
t∑
i=1
Li · ei
Unfortunately, choosing identities in a large identity space causes the norm of errors out
of control and prevents correct inversion. To resolve this problem, we take advantage of the
technique of “clearing out the denominator” [25,26,27]. Note that since the Lagrangian coeffi-
cients are rational numbers and the identity is chosen in [n], we can scale them to be integers
by computing (n!)2Li. By instantiating appropriate parameters, we prove that the quantity of
errors preserves bounded, which does not affect the correctness of inversion.
Optimization.We show a relaxation of TTDF called TTDR, and prove that TTDR maintains
same applications of constructing TPKE and RPKE. Informally, TTDR replaces the evaluation
algorithm of TTDF with a relation sampling algorithm which can generate a random input with
its image of a function, while the function need not be efficiently computable. We also formalize
security notion named threshold one-wayness for TTDR following TTDF.
Similarly to instantiating TTDF from TLTDF, we instantiate TTDR by introducing the
notion of threshold lossy trapdoor relation (TLTDR), which is a threshold version of lossy
trapdoor relation (LTDR) 6 [28]. We prove TTDR is naturally implied by TLTDR. Moreover,
we instantiate TLTDR based on the DDH assumption to obtain an instantiation of TTDR,
which is more efficient than TTDF.
6 We give a refined definition of LTDR in Section 8, which is more simple and intuitive than the one introduced
in [28].
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2 Preliminaries
2.1 Notations
We denote the natural numbers by N, the integers by Z, the real numbers by R. We use lower-
case bold letters and upper-case bold letters to denote vectors and matrices (e.g. x and X). Let
xT and XT denote transpositions of vector x and matrix X. For n ∈ N, 1n denotes the string
of n ones, and [n] denotes the set {1, · · · , n}. We use standard asymptotic (O, o,Ω, ω) notation
to denote the growth of positive functions. We denote a negligible function by negl(λ), which
is an f(λ) such that f(λ) = o(λ−c) for every fixed constant c, and we let poly(λ) denote an
unspecified function f(λ) = O(λc) for some constant c. If S is a set then s ← S denotes the
operation of sampling an element s of S at random.
Let X and Y be two random variables over some countable set S. The statistical distance
between X and Y is defined as
△(X,Y ) = 1
2
∑
s∈S
|Pr[X = s]− Pr[Y = s]|.
2.2 Assumptions
DDH Assumption. The generation algorithm Gen takes as input a security parameter 1λ and
outputs (p,G, g), where G is a cyclic group of order p, p is a prime and g is a generator of G.
The DDH assumption [29] is that the ensemble {(G, ga, gb, gab)}λ∈N and {(G, ga, gb, gc)}λ∈N are
computationally indistinguishable, where a, b, c← Zp.
LWE Assumption. Let d be the dimension of lattice, an integer q = poly(d) and all operations
be performed in Zq. For an integer dimension d ∈ Z+, a vector z ∈ Zdq and an error distribution
χ : Zq → R+. Az,χ is the distribution of the variable (a, 〈a, z〉 + e) on Zdq × Zq, where a ← Zdq
and e← χ. The LWE assumption [17] is that for some secret z ∈ Zdq independent samples from
the LWE distribution Az,χ, and independent samples from the uniform distribution on Z
d
q ×Zq
are computationally indistinguishable.
2.3 Randomness Extraction
We use the notion of average min-entropy [30], that captures the remaining unpredictability of
X conditioned on the value of Y :
H˜∞(X|Y ) = −lg(Ey←Y [2−H∞(X|Y=y)])
We review the following lemmas from [30].
Lemma 1. If Y takes at most 2r values and Z is any random variable, then H˜∞(X|(Y,Z)) ≥
H˜∞(X|Z)− r.
Lemma 2. Let X, Y be random variables such that X ∈ {0, 1}l and H˜∞(X|Y ) ≥ k. Let H be
a family of pairwise independent hash functions from {0, 1}l to {0, 1}l′ . Then for h ← H, we
have
△((Y, h, h(X)), (Y, h, Ul′ )) ≤ ǫ
as long as l′ ≤ k − 2 lg(1/ǫ).
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2.4 Threshold Secret Sharing
We now recall the threshold secret sharing scheme [24]. It can be parameterized by the number
of identities n and the threshold value t, and denotes as (n, t)-threshold secret sharing scheme.
Let F be a finite field, |F| > n. Let idi ∈ F, i = 1, · · · , n be distinct, nonzero elements that are
fixed and publicly known. The scheme works as follows:
• Share(s, idi) → si: On input a secret s ∈ F, and any identity idi, i ∈ [n]. It chooses
a1, · · · , at−1 ∈ F, and defines the polynomial p(x) = s +
∑t−1
i=1 aix
i. This is a uniform
degree-(t − 1) polynomial with constant term s. The share of user idi is si = p(idi) ∈ F.
• Combine((idi1 , si1), · · · , (idit , sit)) → s: On input any t identities idij , j = 1, · · · , t, and
associated shares sij , j = 1, · · · , t. Using polynomial interpolation, it computes the unique
degree-(t − 1) polynomial p for which p(idij ) = sij , j = 1, · · · , t. The combining algorithm
outputs the secret s = p(0).
Correctness. It is clear that the combining algorithm works since the secret p(0) = s can be
constructed from any t shares. More precisely, by the Lagrange interpolation formula, given any
t points (idij , p(idij )), j = 1, · · · , t,
p(x) =
t∑
j=1
p(idij )
t∏
l=1,l 6=j
x− idil
idij − idil
,
we can compute all points (idiv , p(idiv )), idiv ∈ F, where the secret is a special point (0, s = p(0)).
Security. The sharing algorithm Share has perfect privacy, that is, any t−1 users learn nothing
of secret s from their shares. For any t−1 users corresponding to identities idij , j = 1, · · · , t−1
and for any secret s (namely, p(0)), the distributions of t− 1 shares of s are perfectly indistin-
guishable from t− 1 independently uniform distributions.
In this paper, when building TLTDF from the LWE assumption, we take advantage of the
technique of “clearing out the denominator” [25,26,27] and the fact that the term (n!)2 · Lj is
an integer, where Lj , j = 1, · · · , t are Lagrangian coefficients.
Lemma 3. ([27], Lemma 2.2). For any t identities idij = ij , ij ∈ [n], j = 1, · · · , t, the product
(n!)2 · Lj is an integer, and |(n!)2 · Lj | ≤ (n!)3.
2.5 Threshold Encryption
We now recall the definition of TPKE from [9]. A (n, t)-TPKE consists of five algorithms as
follows:
• Gen(1λ) → (pk,msk): On input the security parameter 1λ, the key generation algorithm
outputs a public key pk and a master secret key msk.
• Share(msk, idi)→ ski: On input the master secret key msk and a new identity id associated
with the user, the sharing algorithm outputs the shared secret key ski.
• Enc(pk,m) → c: On input the public key pk and a message m, the encryption algorithm
outputs a ciphertext c.
• Dec(ski, c)→ δi: On input a shared secret key ski, i ∈ [n] and the ciphertext c, the decryption
algorithm outputs a decryption share δi.
• Combine(δi1 , · · · , δit , c) → m: On input any t decryption shares δij , j = 1, · · · , t and the
ciphertext c, the combining algorithm outputs the message m.
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Correctness. For any message m, c← Enc(pk,m), and any t decryption shares δi1 , · · · , δit , we
have Combine(δi1 , · · · , δit , c) = m.
Security. Let A be a PPT adversary against IND-CPA security of TPKE scheme with adaptive
corruption. Its advantage function Advind-cpaTPKE,A(λ) is defined as
Adv
ind-cpa
TPKE,A(λ) =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣Pr
b = b′ :
(pk,msk)← Gen(1λ);
(m0,m1)← AShare(msk,·)(pk);
b← {0, 1}, c∗ ← Enc(pk,mb);
b′ ← ADec(·,Enc(pk))(pk, skij , c∗);
− 12
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
Here, Share(msk, ·) denotes a shared secret key oracle that given an input of any identity id,
and outputs a shared secret key skid. The adversary can query the oracle at most t − 1 times
adaptively . Dec(·,Enc(pk)) denotes an oracle that given an input of any identity id, computes
a fresh ciphertext c using Enc(pk) and returns a decryption share Dec(skid, c). This captures
that the adversary may obtain decryption shares of fresh encryptions of known messages. The
(n, t)-TPKE scheme is IND-CPA secure, if for all PPT adversary the advantage function is
negligible.
2.6 Revocation Encryption
We recall the definition of RPKE from [8]. A (n, r)-RPKE consists of four algorithms as follows:
• Gen(1λ, r) → (pk,msk): On input the security parameter 1λ, and the revocation threshold
r, the key generation algorithm outputs a public key pk and a master secret key msk.
• Reg(msk, idi)→ ski: On input the master secret key msk and a new identity id associated
with the user, the registration algorithm outputs the shared secret key ski.
• Enc(pk, S, s)→ c: On input the public key pk, a set S7 of revoked users (with |S| ≤ r) and
a session key s, the encryption algorithm outputs a ciphertext c.
• Dec(ski, c) → s: On input a shared secret key ski of user idi and the ciphertext c, the de-
cryption algorithm outputs the session key s, if idi is a legitimate user when c is constructed.
Correctness. For any idi, i ∈ [n], (pk,msk)← Gen(1λ), any s, and any set S, c← Enc(pk, S, s),
we require that for any non-revoked secret key ski, s = Dec(ski, c).
Security. Let A be a PPT adversary against IND-CPA security of RPKE scheme with adaptive
corruption. Its advantage function Advind-cpaRPKE,A(λ) is defined as
Adv
ind-cpa
RPKE,A(λ) =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣Pr
b = b′ :
(pk,msk)← Gen(1λ);
(s0, s1)← AReg(msk,·)(pk);
b← {0, 1}, c∗ ← Enc(pk, S, sb);
b′ ← A(pk, skij , c∗), j ∈ [r];
− 12
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
Here, Reg(msk, ·) denotes an oracle that given an input of any identity id, and outputs a shared
secret key skid. The adversary can query the oracle at most r times adaptively. If for all PPT
adversary the advantage function is negligible, the (n, r)-RPKE scheme is IND-CPA secure.
7 The set S contains the identities and shared secret keys of revoked users.
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3 Threshold Trapdoor Function
We give the definition and the security of TTDF as follows.
Definition 1. A collection of (n, t)-TTDFs is a tuple of polynomial-time algorithms defined as
follows:
• Gen(1λ)→ (ek,mtd): The generation algorithm is a probabilistic algorithm that on input the
security parameter 1λ, outputs a function index ek and a master trapdoor mtd.
• Share(mtd, idi)→ tdi: The sharing algorithm is a deterministic algorithm that on input the
master trapdoor mtd and any identity idi, i ∈ [n], outputs the shared trapdoor tdi, i ∈ [n].
• F(ek, x) → y: On input the function index ek and x ∈ {0, 1}l, the evaluation algorithm
outputs y.
• F−1(tdi, y) → δi: On input any shared trapdoor tdi and an image y, the partial inversion
algorithm outputs the inversion share δi.
• CombineF−1(ek, x, δi1 , · · · , δit−1 , idit) → δit : On input ek, x ∈ {0, 1}l, any t − 1 inversion
shares δi1 , · · · , δit−1 of the image of x, and identity idit , the combining inversion algorithm
outputs the inversion share δit of identity idit .
• Combine(δi1 , · · · , δit , y)→ x: On input any t inversion shares δij , j = 1, · · · , t and the image
y, the combining algorithm outputs x.
Note that we require that in the partial inversion algorithm and the combining algorithm, if a
value y is not in the image, the behavior of the algorithms are unspecified.
Correctness. For any idi, (ek,mtd)←Gen(1λ), tdi←Share(mtd, idi), i ∈ [n], x ← {0, 1}l,
y = F(ek, x), we require that for any t shared trapdoors tdi1 , · · · , tdit , we have
x = Combine(F−1(tdi1 , y), · · · ,F−1(tdit , y), y).
Security. Let A be a PPT adversary against (n, t)-TTDF and define its advantage function
AdvtowTTDF,A(λ) as
AdvtowTTDF,A(λ) = Pr
x = x′ : (ek,mtd)← Gen(1λ);x← {0, 1}l , y = F(ek, x);
x′ ← AShare(mtd,·)(ek, y)

Here, Share(mtd, ·) denotes a shared trapdoor oracle that given an input of any identity id, and
outputs a shared trapdoor tdid. The adversary can query the oracle at most t−1 times adaptively.
If for any PPT adversary the advantage function is negligible, (n, t)-TTDF is threshold one-way.
3.1 Connection to Function Sharing
De Santis et al. [2] introduced the notion of function sharing (FS) parameterized by the threshold
value t and the number of identities n. (n, t)-FS can split the master trapdoor into n shared
trapdoors, where n is a fixed polynomial of the security parameter. The function is easy to invert
when given t shared trapdoors, while any PPT adversary cannot invert the function even if it
obtains any t− 1 shared trapdoors and a history tape H that contains partial inversion shares
of polynomial many random images. Then they constructed threshold cryptosystems based on
FS and instantiated it under the RSA assumption. However, the number of identities of their
FS and TPKE is limited in a fixed polynomial of security parameter.
Our notion of TTDF differs from FS as follows: TTDF can support exponential number of
identities and the generation algorithm and the sharing algorithm of TTDF are independent of
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the number of identities. Moreover, in the security experiment of TTDF, it omits the complicated
history tape defined in the security experiment of FS. More precisely, (n, t)-TTDF has an
additional combining inversion algorithm that given the function index ek, any preimage x and
any t−1 inversion shares of the image of x, can compute the inversion share of any other identity.
In the security experiment of (n, t)-TTDF, any adversary given any t− 1 shared trapdoors can
compute inversion shares of any other identity with the help of the preimage. While in the
security experiment of (n, t)-FS, the adversary can only look up the history tape H to obtain
inversion shares of some identities contained in H, and the length of H is a fixed polynomial
of the security parameter. Therefore, (n, t)-TTDF implies (n, t)-FS, and (n, t)-TTDF can be
used to construct TPKE scheme [9] which supports ad-hoc groups (i.e., exponential number of
identities and the generation algorithm is independent of the number of identities), the reason
is that the reduction algorithm who holds any t − 1 shared trapdoors can answer the shared
decryption oracle of all identities.
4 Threshold Encryption from TTDF
Let (Gen,Share,F,F−1,CombineF−1,Combine) be a (n, t)-TTDF and hc(·) be a hardcore func-
tion. We construct a TPKE as follows:
• Gen(1λ) → (pk,msk): On input the security parameter 1λ, the generation algorithm runs
(ek,mtd) ← TTDF.Gen(1λ) and outputs a public key pk = ek and a master secret key
msk = mtd.
• Share(msk, idi) → ski: On input the master secret key msk and any identity idi, i ∈ [n],
the sharing algorithm runs tdi ← TTDF.Share(msk, idi) and outputs the shared secret key
ski = tdi, i ∈ [n].
• Enc(pk,m) → c: On input the public key pk and a message m, the encryption algorithm
chooses x ← {0, 1}l , computes c1 = TTDF.F(pk, x), c2 = hc(x) ⊕ m, and outputs the
ciphertext c = (c1, c2).
• Dec(ski, c) → δi: On input a secret key ski and a ciphertext c, the decryption algorithm
computes δi = TTDF.F
−1(ski, c1), and outputs a decryption share δi.
• Combine(δi1 , · · · , δit , c) → m: On input any t decryption shares δij , j = 1, · · · , t and the ci-
phertext c = (c1, c2), the combining algorithm computes x = TTDF.Combine(δi1 , · · · , δit , c1),
m = hc(x)⊕ c2. It outputs the message m.
Theorem 1. If the TTDF is threshold one-way, then the TPKE is IND-CPA secure.
Proof. We define two hybrid experiments Game1, Game2.
• Game1: The game is identical to the IND-CPA experiment. At the beginning, the challenger
runs Gen to obtain pk and msk. The challenger sends pk to A. A can query the shared
secret key oracle Share(msk, ·) adaptively. Then the challenger runs the sharing algorithm
to answer A. Upon receiving the messages m0, m1 from A, the challenger chooses b ∈ {0, 1}
at random and returns c∗ = Enc(pk,mb) to A. A is still able to have access to the oracle
Dec(·,Enc(pk)). At the end of the game, A outputs b′ ∈ {0, 1} as the guess of b. If b′ = b, A
wins this game, otherwise fails.
• Game2: The game is identical to Game1, except that when the challenger generates the
challenge ciphertext c∗ = (c1, c2), it replaces c2 = mb ⊕ hc(x) with c2 = mb ⊕ r.
For i ∈ {1, 2}, let Pr[AGamei = b] be the probability that A outputs the bit b when executed
in Gamei. We claim that if there is an adversary A against the TPKE such that Pr[AGame1 =
b] − Pr[AGame2 = b] is non-negligible, we can construct a distinguisher D against the hardcore
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function. On input (ek, y, r), where ek is a function index, y = F(ek, x) with x← {0, 1}l and r
is either hc(x) or a random string, D works as follows:
1. D runs A on input pk = ek.D can simulate the shared secret key oracle by querying the
shared trapdoor oracle Share(mtd, ·) adaptively.
2. Upon receiving two messages m0, m1 from A, D chooses b ∈ {0, 1} at random, let c1 =
y, c2 = mb ⊕ r, and returns c = (c1, c2) to A. A is able to have access to the oracle
Dec(·,Enc(pk)). D chooses x′8 in the domain at random, fixes the corrupted secret keys, and
computes the decryption share by the combining inversion algorithm to simulate the oracle
Dec(·,Enc(pk)). More precisely, D computes c′1 = TTDF.F(pk, x′), δi1 =TTDF.F−1(tdi1 , c1),
· · · , δit−1 =TTDF.F−1(tdit−1 , c1), δ′ =TTDF.CombineF−1( x′, c1, δi1 , · · · , δit−1 , id′), then D
returns δ′ to A. At last D outputs what A outputs.
3. if b = b′, D returns “1” to denote r is the output of the hardcore function, otherwise returns
“0” to denote r is a random string.
The distinguisher D can give a perfect simulation of either Game1 or Game2. The advantage of D
is non-negligible, which is a contradiction of the threshold one-wayness. Therefore, |Pr[AGame1 =
b]− Pr[AGame2 = b]| ≤ negl(λ).
Finally, in Game2 the output of hardcore function has been replaced with a random string,
so Pr[AGame2 = b] = 1/2. We have:
Pr[AGame1 = b] ≤ |Pr[AGame1 = b]− Pr[AGame2 = b]|+ Pr[AGame2 = b]
≤ 1
2
+ negl(λ)
Therefore, the TPKE is IND-CPA secure.
5 Revocation Encryption from TTDF
Let (Gen,Share,F,F−1,CombineF−1,Combine) be a (n, t)-TTDF and hc(·) be a hardcore func-
tion. We construct a (n, t− 1)-RPKE as follows:
• Gen(1λ) → (pk,msk): On input the security parameter 1λ, the generation algorithm runs
(ek,mtd) ← TTDF.Gen(1λ) and outputs a public key pk = ek and a master secret key
msk = mtd.
• Reg(msk, idi) → ski: On input the master secret key msk and any identity idi, i ∈ [n], the
registration algorithm runs tdi ← TTDF.Share(mtd, idi) and outputs the shared secret key
ski = tdi, i ∈ [n].
• Enc(pk, ski1 , · · · , skit−1 , s) → c: On inputs the public key pk, a set of t − 1 revoked secret
keys skij , j = 1, · · · , t− 1 and a session key s, the encryption algorithm chooses x← {0, 1}l,
computes c1 = TTDF.F(pk, x), c2 = hc(x)⊕s and δij = TTDF.F−1(skij , c1), j = 1, · · · , t−1.
It outputs the ciphertext c = (c1, c2, δi1 , · · · , δit−1).
• Dec(skij , c)→ s: On inputs a secret key skij , j 6= 1, · · · , t−1 and a ciphertext c, the decryp-
tion algorithm computes δij = TTDF.F
−1(skij , c1), j 6= 1, · · · , t−1, x = TTDF.Combine(δi1 ,
· · · , δit−1 , δij , c1) and s = hc(x)⊕ c2. It outputs session key s.
Theorem 2. If the TTDF is threshold one-way, then the RPKE is IND-CPA secure.
Proof. We define two hybrid experiments Game1, Game2.
8 The preimage x′ is chosen by D, so it can computes decryption share of any identity.
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• Game1: The game is identical to the IND-CPA experiment. At the beginning, the challenger
runs (pk, msk) ← Gen(1λ) and gives the pk to the adversary A, A can query the shared
secret key oracle Reg(msk, ·) adaptively. Then the challenger runs the registration algorithm
to answer A. Upon receiving two session keys s0, s1 from A, the challenger chooses b ∈ {0, 1}
at random and returns c∗ = Enc(pk, ski1 , · · · , skit−1 , sb) to A. At the end of the game, A
outputs b′ ∈ {0, 1} as the guess of b. If b′ = b, A wins this game, otherwise fails.
• Game2: The game is identical to Game1, except when the challenger generates the challenge
ciphertext c∗ = (c1, c2, δi1 , · · · , δit−1), it replaces c2 = sb⊕ hc(x) with c2 = sb⊕ r, where r is
a random string.
For i ∈ {1, 2}, let Pr[AGamei = b] be the probability that A outputs the bit b when executed in
Gamei. We claim that if there is an adversary A such that Pr[AGame1 = b] − Pr[AGame2 = b]
is non-negligible, we can construct a distinguisher D against the hardcore function. On input
(ek, y, r), where ek is a function index, y = F(ek, x) with x← {0, 1}l and r is either hc(x) or a
random string, D works as follows:
1. D runs A on input pk = ek. D can simulate the shared secret key oracle by querying the
shared trapdoor oracle Share(mtd, ·) adaptively.
2. Upon receiving two session keys s0, s1. D chooses b ∈ {0, 1} at random, let c1 = y, c2 = sb⊕r,
computes δij = F
−1(skij , c1), j = 1, · · · , t − 1, returns c = (c1, c2, δi1 , · · · , δit−1) to A and
gets a bit b′ output by A.
3. if b = b′, D returns “1” to denote r is the output of the hardcore function, otherwise returns
“0” to denote r is a random string.
The distinguisher D can give a perfect simulation of either Game1 or Game2. The advantage of D
is non-negligible, which is a contradiction of the threshold one-wayness. Therefore, |Pr[AGame1 =
b]− Pr[AGame2 = b]| ≤ negl(λ).
Finally, in Game2 the output of hardcore function has been replaced with a random string,
so Pr[AGame2 = b] = 1/2. We have:
Pr[AGame1 = b] ≤ |Pr[AGame1 = b]− Pr[AGame2 = b]|+ Pr[AGame2 = b]
≤ 1
2
+ negl(λ)
Therefore, the RPKE is IND-CPA secure.
6 Threshold Lossy Trapdoor Function
In this section, we introduce a new cryptographic primitive called TLTDF which is a threshold
version of LTDF [23] and prove that TLTDF implies TTDF.
Let l(λ) = poly(λ) denote the input length of the function, k(λ) ≤ l(λ) and r(λ) = l(λ)−k(λ)
denote the lossiness and the residual leakage. For notational convenience, we often omit the
dependence on λ, and define the sampling algorithm Sampinj(·) :=Samp(·, 1) samples injective
mode and Samploss(·) :=Samp(·, 0) samples lossy mode.
Definition 2. A collection of (n, t, l, k)-TLTDFs is a tuple of polynomial-time algorithms de-
fined as follows.
• Sampinj(1λ) → (ek,mtd): The sampling algorithm is a probabilistic algorithm that on input
the security parameter 1λ, outputs a function index ek and a master trapdoor mtd.
• Samploss(1λ)→ (ek,mtd): The sampling algorithm is a probabilistic algorithm that on input
the security parameter 1λ, outputs a function index ek and a master trapdoor mtd.
11
• Share(mtd, idi)→ tdi: The sharing algorithm is a deterministic algorithm that on input the
master trapdoor mtd and any identity idi, i ∈ [n], outputs the shared trapdoor tdi, i ∈ [n] in
both modes.
• F(ek, x) → y: On input the function index ek and x ∈ {0, 1}l, the evaluation algorithm
outputs y in both modes, but the image has size at most 2r = 2l−k in the lossy mode.
• F−1(tdi, y) → δi: On input any shared trapdoor tdi, i ∈ [n] and an image y, the partial
inversion algorithm outputs an inversion share δi.
• CombineF−1(ek, x, δi1 , · · · , δit−1 , idit) → δit : On input ek, x ∈ {0, 1}l, any t − 1 inversion
shares δi1 , · · · , δit−1 of the image of x, and identity idit , the combining inversion algorithm
outputs the inversion share δit of identity idit .
• Combine(δi1 , · · · , δit , y)→ x: On input any t inversion shares δij , j = 1, · · · , t and the image
y, in injective mode the combining algorithm outputs x.
Note that we require that the shared trapdoors in both modes have the same space, and the
behavior of the partial inversion algorithm and the combining algorithm is unspecified, if a value
y is not in the image.
Security. Let A be a PPT adversary against TLTDF and define its advantage function as
AdvindTLTDF,A(λ) =
∣∣∣∣∣∣Pr
b = b′ : b← {0, 1};(ek,mtd)← Samp(1λ, b);
b′ ← AShare(mtd,·)(ek)
− 1
2
∣∣∣∣∣∣
Here, Share(mtd, ·) denotes a shared trapdoor oracle that given an input of any identity id,
and outputs a shared trapdoor tdid. The adversary can query the oracle at most t − 1 times
adaptively. A TLTDF is said to produce indistinguishable function indexes if AdvindTLTDF,A(λ)
is negligible for all adversary.
Theorem 3. If the sharing algorithm holds perfect privacy and the injective and lossy modes of
LTDF are indistinguishable, then the TLTDF described above is also hard to distinguish injective
from lossy.
Proof. We define four hybrid experiments Game1, Game2, Game3, Game4.
• Game1: The challenger runs (ek,mtd) ← Sampinj(1λ), and gives ek to A. A can adaptively
query the shared trapdoor oracle Share(mtd, ·) at most t−1 times. Then the challenger runs
the sharing algorithm to answer A.
• Game2: The game is identical to Game1, except that the challenger generates the corrupted
trapdoors by choosing ri, i = 1, · · · , t− 1 at random in the shared trapdoor space and then
gives them to A.
• Game3: The game is identical to Game2, except that the challenger runs (ek,mtd) ←
Samploss(1
λ) instead of running (ek,mtd)← Sampinj(1λ).
• Game4: The game is identical to Game3, except that the challenger runs the sharing algo-
rithm to generate the shared trapdoor and gives the shared trapdoors to A.
The adversary’s view is perfectly indistinguishable in Game1 and Game2 with the replacement
of the shared trapdoors, since the sharing algorithm has the perfect privacy. Similarly, the ad-
versary’s view is perfectly indistinguishable in Game3 and Game4. The only difference between
Game2 and Game3 is the sampling algorithm. So the adversary’s view is computationally indis-
tinguishable in Game2 and Game3, the fact follows that the injective and lossy modes of LTDF
are indistinguishable [23]. Therefore, the adversary’s view is computationally indistinguishable
in Game1 and Game4 and the TLTDF described above is hard to distinguish injective from
lossy, even if the adversary can obtains any t− 1 shared trapdoors adaptively.
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Theorem 4. Let TLTDF = (Sampinj, Samploss, Share, F, F
−1, CombineF−1, Combine) give a
collection of (n, t, l, k)-TLTDFs with k = ω(log λ). Then TTDF = (Sampinj, Share, F, F
−1,
CombineF−1, Combine) give a collection of (n, t)-TTDFs.
Proof. By definition, for any idi, i ∈ [n], (ek, mtd)←Sampinj(1λ), tdi ← Share(mtd, idi), x ←
{0, 1}l, y = F(ek, x), for any t− 1 inversion shares δi1 = F−1(tdi1 , y), · · · , δit−1 = F−1(tdit−1 , y)
and identity idit , we have δit = F
−1(tdit , y) = CombineF
−1(x, y, δi1 , · · · , δit−1 , idit), and for
any t shared trapdoors tdi1 , · · · , tdit , we have x = Combine(F−1(tdi1 , y), · · · ,F−1(tdit , y), y).
Therefore, the correctness condition holds. We prove that the function also holds the threshold
one-wayness:
Suppose A is a PPT inverter, if A can break the threshold one-wayness with non-negligible
probability, we can build an adaptive distinguisher D between injective modes and lossy ones.
D is given a function index ek as input. Its goal is to distinguish ek is generated in the injective
or lossy mode. D works as follows:
1. D runs inverter A on input the function index ek and gets identities output by A.
2. D chooses these identities to corrupt and obtains associated trapdoors, then D chooses
x ← {0, 1}l, computes y = F(ek, x), gives the value y and the associated trapdoors to A,
and then obtains the value x′ output by A.
3. if x′ = x, D returns “1” to denote ek is generated in the injective mode, otherwise returns
“0” to denote ek is generated in the lossy mode.
First, by the assumption on A, if ek is generated by Sampinj(1λ), we have x′ = x with non-
negligible probability and D outputs “1”. Suppose ek is generated by Samploss(1λ). The proba-
bility that even an unbounded algorithm A predicts x is given by the average min-entropy of x
conditioned on (ek, tdi1 , · · · , tdit−1 , F(ek, ·)), Because F(ek, ·) takes at most 2l−k values, ek and
x are independent. By ([23], Lemma 2.1)
H˜∞(x|ek, tdi1 , · · · , tdit−1 ,F(ek, x)) ≥ H˜∞(x|ek, tdi1 , · · · , tdit−1)− (l − k)
= l − (l − k) = k
where by the perfect privacy of the sharing algorithm, tdij , j = 1, · · · , t − 1 look like random
numbers. Since k = ω(log λ), the probability that A outputs x and D outputs “0” is negl(λ). D
distinguishes injective mode from lossy mode, a contradiction of the hypothesis.
Remarks. In our applications of TPKE and RPKE, we use the pairwise independent hash
function [31] as a hardcore function. Let H : {0, 1}l → {0, 1}l′ be a family of pairwise indepen-
dent hash functions, where l′ ≤ k − 2 lg(1/ǫ) for some negligible ǫ = negl(λ), and we choose
hc ← H. Following the Theorem 4, H˜∞(x|ek, tdi1 , · · · , tdit−1 ,F(ek, x)) ≥ k. By the hypothesis
that l′ ≤ k − 2 lg(1/ǫ) and Lemma 2, we have that hc(x) is ǫ-close to uniform.
7 Instantiations of TLTDF
In this section, we give instantiations of TLTDF based on the DDH assumption and the LWE
assumption.
7.1 Instantiation of TLTDF Based on the DDH Assumption
By using the ElGamal-like encryption primitive in [23], we generate a ciphertext C1 by encrypt-
ing the identity matrix I in the injective mode and generate a ciphertext C0 by encrypting the
all-zeros matrix 0 in the lossy mode.
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Lemma 4. ([23], Lemma 5.1). The matrix encryption scheme produces indistinguishable ci-
phertexts under the DDH assumption.
Construction. We now describe a DDH-based TLTDF as follows. The identity space is given
by Zp\{0}.
• Sampinj: On input 1λ, it chooses (p,G, g) ← Gen(1λ), samples ri, si, bij ← Zp, i = 1, · · · , l,
j = 1, · · · , t− 1 and computes
C1 =

gr1 gr1s1g · · · gr1sl
gr2 gr2s1 · · · gr2sl
...
...
. . .
...
grl grls1 · · · grlslg

The function index is ek = C1 and the master trapdoor is mtd = ((si),D = (bij)).
• Samploss: On input 1λ, it chooses (p,G, g) ← Gen(1λ), samples ri, si, bij ← Zp, i = 1, · · · , l,
j = 1, · · · , t− 1 and computes
C0 =

gr1 gr1s1 · · · gr1sl
gr2 gr2s1 · · · gr2sl
...
...
. . .
...
grl grls1 · · · grlsl

The function index is ek = C0 and the master trapdoor is mtd = ((si),D = (bij)).
• Share: On input the master trapdoor mtd and any identity idi, i = 1, · · · , n, it sets
fj(x) = sj + bj1x+ · · · + bj(t−1)xt−1, j ∈ [l].
and outputs tdTi = (f1(idi), · · · , fl(idi)).
• F: On input a function index ek=(cij)l×(l+1) and x ∈ {0, 1}l, x = (x1, · · · , xl), it outputs
y=(y1, · · · , y(l+1)), yi = cx11i cx22i · · · cxlli , i = 1, · · · , l + 1.
• F−1: On input any shared trapdoor tdi and the value y1. It outputs δTi = (yf1(idi)1 , · · · , yfl(idi)1 ).
• CombineF−1: On input ek, x ∈ {0, 1}l, any t − 1 inversion shares δij , j = 1, · · · , t − 1
and identity idit . Because of fj(idit) =
∑t−1
v=0 Lvfj(idiv ), j = 1, · · · , l, where Lv, v =
0, 1, · · · , t − 1 are the Lagrangian coefficients which may be efficiently computed given
(idi0 = 0, idi1 , · · · , idit−1), it computes y = F(ek,x), and y
fi(idi0 )
1 = y
si
1 = yi+1/xi, y
fi(idit )
1 =∏t−1
v=0
(
y
fi(idiv )
1
)Lv
, i = 1, · · · , l, and outputs δTit = (y
f1(idit )
1 , · · · , y
fl(idit )
1 ).
• Combine: On input any t inversion shares δij , j = 1, · · · , t and the value y. Because of fj(0) =∑t
v=1 Lvfj(idiv ), j = 1, · · · , l, where Lv, v = 1, · · · , t are the Lagrangian coefficients which
may be efficiently computed given (idi1 , · · · , idit), it computes ysi1 =
∏t
v=1
(
y
fi(idiv )
1
)Lv
, i =
1, · · · , l and outputs x = (x1, · · · , xl), where xi = 1, if yi+1/ysi1 = g, i = 1, · · · , l, and xi = 0,
if yi+1/y
si
1 = 1, i = 1, · · · , l.
Lemma 5. The algorithms give a collection of (n, t, l, l − lg p)-TLTDFs under the DDH as-
sumption.
Proof. The (n, t)-threshold secret sharing scheme holds the perfect privacy. Both modes of
LTDF are computationally indistinguishable. Therefore, we can show the indistinguishability
between injective and lossy mode of TLTDF.
We transform the inversion algorithm into threshold version which does not change the lossy
mode. In the lossy mode, the number of possible function outputs is at most p, the residual
leakage r ≤ lg p, and the lossiness is k = n− r ≥ l − lg p.
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7.2 Instantiation of TLTDF Based on the LWE Assumption
We recall a variant of LWE-based symmetric key cryptosystem [23] which has a small message
space. Let T = R/Z, η ∈ N. For every message m ∈ Zp, we define the “offset” cm = m/p ∈ T.
The secret key is z← Zdq . To encrypt m ∈ Zp, we choose a← Zdq and an error term e← χ. The
ciphertext is
Ez(m,u;a, e) = (a, 〈a, z〉 + qcm + u+ e) ∈ Zdq × Zq
where the rounding error u = ⌊qcm⌉ − qcm ∈ [−1/2, 1/2]. For a ciphertext c = (a, c′), the
decryption algorithm computes t = η(c′ − 〈a, z〉)/q and outputs m ∈ Zp, such that t − ηcm is
closest to 0. Note that for any ciphertext, as long as the absolute total error |ηe+ ηu| ≤ ηq/2p,
the decryption is correct.
We use “matrix encryption” mechanism in [23] to generate the ciphertext
C = EZ(M,U;A,E)
where M = (mi,j) ∈ Zh×wp is a message matrix, U = (ui,j) is a matrix of rounding errors,
E = (ei,j) ∈ Zh×wq is error matrix, ei,j ← χ, choose independent zj ← Zdq , Z = (z1, · · · , zw), for
each row i ∈ [h] of the random matrix A ∈ Zh×dq , choose independent ai ← Zdq .
In the injective mode, the message matrix M is a matrix B, which is the tensor product
I ⊗ b, where I ∈ Zw×wp is the identity and b = (1, 2 · · · , 2l−1)T ∈ Zlp, l = ⌊log p⌋, w = h/l. In
the lossy mode, the message matrix M is all-zeros matrix 0.
Lemma 6. ([23], Lemma 6.2). For h,w = poly(d), the matrix encryption scheme produces
indistinguishable ciphertexts under the assumption that LWEq,χ is hard.
Construction.We describe a LWE-based TLTDF as follows. By using the technique of clearing
out the denominator to bound the quantity of errors, we require that the identity space ID = [n],
n ∈ N and set η = (n!)3.
• Sampinj: On input 1d, it generates C = EZ(B,U;A,E) and outputs the function index C
and the master trapdoor mtd = (zi,Di), where zi = (z
(i)
j ), Di = (b
(i)
jk ), z
(i)
j , b
(i)
jk ← Zq,
i = 1, · · · , w, j = 1, · · · , d, k = 1, · · · , t− 1.
• Samploss: On input 1d, it generates C = EZ(0,U;A,E) and outputs the function index C
and the master trapdoor mtd = (zi,Di), where zi = (z
(i)
j ), Di = (b
(i)
jk ), z
(i)
j , b
(i)
jk ← Zq,
i = 1, · · · , w, j = 1, · · · , d, k = 1, · · · , t− 1.
• Share: On input the master trapdoor mtd and any identity idiv = iv ∈ [n], it sets f ij(x) =
z
(i)
j + b
(i)
j1x+ · · ·+ b(i)j(t−1)xt−1, j = 1, · · · , d
and outputs
tdiv =
f
(1)
1 (iv) f
(2)
1 (iv) · · · f (w)1 (iv)
...
...
. . .
...
f
(1)
d (iv) f
(2)
d (iv) · · · f
(w)
d (iv)

• F: On input the function index C and x ∈ {0, 1}h, it outputs the vector a= xA and y = xC.
• F−1: On input any shared trapdoor tdiv and a = xA, it outputs the inversion share
δ
(i)
iv
=
〈
a,
f
(i)
1 (iv)
...
f
(i)
d (iv)
〉+ e(i)iv
where i = 1, · · · , w.
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• CombineF−1: On input ek, x ∈ {0, 1}h, any t − 1 inversion shares δiv , v = 1, · · · , t − 1 and
identity idit . Because of f
(i)
j (it) =
∑t−1
v=0 Lvf
(i)
j (iv), j = 1, · · · , d, i = 1, · · · , w, where Lv,
v = 0, 1, · · · , t − 1 are Lagrangian coefficients which may be efficiently computed given
i0 = 0, i1, · · · , it−1, it computes the image y = (y1, · · · , yw) of x and xB = (m1, · · · ,mw).
For every i = 1, · · · , w, δ(i)i0 = 〈a, zi〉 + ei = yi − ⌊qcmi⌉ = 〈a, zi〉 + (xE)i. It outputs the
inversion share δit =
∑t−1
v=0 Lvδiv .
• Combine: On input any t inversion shares δi1 , · · · , δit . Because of f (i)j (0) =
∑t
v=1 Lvf
(i)
j (iv),
j = 1, · · · , d, i = 1, · · · , w, where Lv, v = 1, · · · , t are Lagrangian coefficients which can be
efficiently computed given any t identities i1, · · · , it, it computes
Lvδ
(i)
iv
=
〈
a, Lv
f
(i)
1 (iv)
...
f
(i)
d (iv)
〉+ Lve(i)iv ,
where v = 1, · · · , t.
y′i =
t∑
v=1
Lvδ
(i)
iv
=
〈
a,
L1f
(i)
1 (i1) + · · ·+ Ltf (i)1 (it)
...
L1f
(i)
d (i1) + · · ·+ Ltf (i)d (it)
〉+ t∑
v=1
Lve
(i)
iv
= 〈a, zi〉+
t∑
v=1
Lve
(i)
iv
where i = 1, · · · , w and gets y′ = (y′1, · · · , y′w), then it computes y′′i = η(yi − y′i)/q, i =
1, · · · , w and obtains mi ∈ Zp such that y′′ − ηcmi is closest to 0. Finally, it outputs x ∈
{0, 1}h, so that xB = (m1, · · · ,mw).
We show correctness and lossy properties of our TLTDF as follows.
We recall some probability distributions in [23]. For α ∈ R+, let Ψα be a normal variable
with mean 0 and standard deviation α√
2pi
on T. For any probability φ : T → R+ and q ∈ Z+,
let its discretization φ¯ : Zq → R+ be the discrete distribution over Zq of the random variable
⌊q ·Xφ⌉ mod q, where Xφ is the distribution φ.
Lemma 7. Let q ≥ 4p(h + γ), α ≤ 1/(16p(h + g)) for g ≥ γ2, γ = ∑tv=1 ηLv, where Lv,
v = 1, · · · , t is the Lagrangian coefficient. The error matrix E = (ei,j) ∈ Zh×wq is generated by
choosing independent error terms ei,j ← χ = Ψ¯α and eiv ← χ, v = 1, · · · , t. Every entry of
xE +
∑t
v=1 ηLveiv has absolute value less than q/4p for all x ∈ {0, 1}h, except with probability
at most w · 2−g over the choice of E and eiv .
Proof. By definition, ei = ⌊qsi⌉ mod q, eiv = ⌊qsiv⌉ mod q where si, siv are independent nor-
mal variables with mean 0 and variance α2 for each i ∈ [h], v ∈ [t]. Let s′ = 〈x, e〉 +∑t
v=1 ηLveiv , where e = (e1, · · · , eh)T . Then s′ is at most (h + γ)/2 ≤ q/8p away from
q((〈x, s〉 +∑tv=1 ηLvsiv) mod 1).
Since the si, siv are independent, 〈x, s〉 +
∑t
v=1 ηLvsiv is distributed as a normal variable
with mean 0 and variance at most (h + γ2)α2 ≤ (h + g)α2, where γ2 > ∑tv=1(ηLv)2, hence a
standard deviation of at most (
√
h+ g)α. Then by the tail inequality on normal variables and
the hypothesis on α,
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Pr[|〈x, s〉 +
t∑
v=1
ηLvsiv | ≥ 1/8p] ≤ Pr[|〈x, s〉 +
t∑
v=1
ηLvsiv | ≥ 2
√
h+ g(
√
h+ g)α]
≤ exp(−2(h + g))
2
√
h+ g
< 2−(h+g).
We show that for any fixed x ∈ {0, 1}h, Pr[|s′| ≥ q/4p] ≤ 2−(h+g). Taking a union bound
over all x ∈ {0, 1}h, we can conclude that |s′| < q/4p for all x ∈ {0, 1}h except with probability
at most 2−g.
Therefore, for each column e of E and eiv , v = 1, · · · , t, |s′| < q/4p, for all x except with
probability at most 2−g over the choice of e and eiv , v = 1, · · · , t. The lemma follows by a union
bound over all w columns of E.
Parameters. Instantiate the parameters: let p = hc1 for constant c1 > 0, h = d
c3 for constant
c3 > 1, γ =
∑t
v=1 ηLv, where Lv is the Lagrangian coefficient, eiv ← χ, v = 1, · · · , t, let χ = Ψ¯α
where α ≤ 1/(32ph) and let q ∈ [2√d/α,O(phc2)] for constant c2 > 1.
Note that for A ∈ Zh×dq , the size of the function index is hd log q = dc3+1 log q = Ω(d2 log d)
and for (xA,xC) ∈ Zdq × Zwq , the size of the image is (h+ w) log q = (dc3 + dc3/⌊log p⌋) log q =
Ω(d log d).
Correctness.We now show correctness of the above TLTDF by proving the following theorem.
Theorem 5. The TLTDF with above parameters instantiated satisfies the correctness.
Proof. The combining algorithm computes y′ = (y′1, · · · , y′w) as follows:
y′i = 〈a, zi〉+
t∑
v=1
Lve
(i)
iv
= 〈a, zi〉+
t∑
v=1
Lve
(i)
iv
.
We have
y′′i =
|η(yi − y′i)|
q
=
|ηcmiq + η(xU)i + η(xE)i −
∑t
v=1 ηLve
(i)
iv
|
q
.
Let g = h ≥ γ2 in above Lemma 7, the absolute total error
|(xU)i + (xE)i −
t∑
v=1
ηLve
(i)
iv
| ≤ |(xU)i|+ (|(xE)i|+ |
t∑
v=1
ηLve
(i)
iv
|)
≤ q
8p
+
q
4p
<
q
2p
.
We have
|η(xU)i + η(xE)i −
t∑
v=1
ηLve
(i)
iv
| ≤ η|(xU)i|+ (η|(xE)i|+ η|
t∑
v=1
ηLve
(i)
iv
|)
<
ηq
2p
.
Therefore, the inversion is correct.
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Theorem 6. The TLTDF with above parameters produces indistinguishable function indexes
under the LWEq,χ assumption. Moreover, the algorithms give a collection of (n, t, h, k)-TLTDFs
under the LWEq,χ assumption is hard. The residual leakage r = h− k is
r ≤
(
c2
c1
+ o(1)
)
· h.
Proof. The (n, t)-threshold secret sharing scheme holds the perfect privacy and the injective and
lossy modes of LTDF are indistinguishable [23]. Therefore, we can show the indistinguishability
between injective and lossy mode of TLTDF.
We transform the inversion algorithm into threshold version which does not change the lossy
mode. In the lossy mode, as in the correctness argument, |(xU)i|+(|(xE)i|+ |
∑t
v=1 ηLve
(i)
iv
|) <
q
2p . Therefore, for i ∈ [w], the function output yi = 〈xA, zi〉 + |(xU)i| + 0 + (|(xE)i| +
|∑tv=1 ηLve(i)iv |) can take at most q/p possible values. Then the number of possible function
outputs is at most qd(q/p)w. The proof follows ([23], Theorem 6.4), we omit the details.
8 Threshold Trapdoor Relation
We show a relaxation of TTDF called TTDR and prove that TTDR maintains same applications
of constructing TPKE and RPKE.
Definition 3. A collection of (n, t)-TTDRs is a tuple of polynomial-time algorithms as follows:
• Gen(1λ)→ (ek,mtd): The generation algorithm is a probabilistic algorithm that on input the
security parameter 1λ, outputs a function index ek and a master trapdoor mtd.
• Share(mtd, idi)→ tdi: The sharing algorithm is a deterministic algorithm that on input the
master trapdoor mtd and any identity idi, i ∈ [n], outputs the shared trapdoor tdi, i ∈ [n].
• Samp(ek)→ (x, y): On input the function index ek, the relation sampling algorithm samples
a relation (x, y = F(ek, x)).
• F−1(tdi, y) → δi: On input any shared trapdoor tdi and an image y, the partial inversion
algorithm outputs the inversion share δi.
• CombineF−1(x, y, δi1 , · · · , δit−1 , idit) → δit : On input x ∈ {0, 1}l, its image y, any t − 1
inversion shares δi1 , · · · , δit−1 , and identity idit, the combining inversion algorithm outputs
the inversion share δit of identity idit .
• Combine(δi1 , · · · , δit , y)→ x: On input any t inversion shares δij , j = 1, · · · , t and the image
y, the combining algorithm outputs x.
we require that in the partial inversion algorithm, the combining inversion algorithm and the
combining algorithm, the behavior of the algorithms is unspecified, if the y is not in the image.
Correctness. For any idi, i ∈ [n], (ek,mtd) ← Gen(1λ), tdi ← Share(mtd, idi), any relation
(x, y = F(ek, x)), we require that for any t shared trapdoors tdi1 , · · · , tdit , we have
x = Combine(F−1(tdi1 , y), · · · ,F−1(tdit , y), y).
Security. Let A be a PPT adversary and define its advantage function AdvtowTTDR,A(λ) as
AdvtowTTDR,A(λ) = Pr
x = x′ : (ek,mtd)← Gen(1λ);(x, y)← Samp(ek);
x′ ← AShare(mtd,·)(ek, y)

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Here, Share(mtd, ·) denotes a shared trapdoor oracle that given an input of any identity id,
and outputs a shared trapdoor tdid. The adversary can query the oracle at most t − 1 times
adaptively. A (n, t)-TTDR is threshold one-way if for any PPT adversary the advantage function
is negligible.
Following the constructions of TPKE and RPKE from TTDF, we can show generic construc-
tions of TPKE and RPKE from TTDR by running the relation sampling algorithm of TTDR
instead of the evaluation algorithm of TTDF in the encryption algorithm. The threshold one-
wayness ensures that both of TPKE and RPKE are IND-CPA secure.
Threshold Lossy Trapdoor Relation. Following the definitions of TTDR and TLTDF, by
relaxing the evaluation algorithm of TLTDF into relation sampling algorithm, we present the
definition of TLTDR and show that TLTDR also produces indistinguishable function indexes.
Similarly, we can prove TLTDR implies TTDR.
We propose a refined definition of the relation by omitting the public computable injective
map in LTDR [28]. Informally, the function index ek is a composite function description which
consists of the inverse map of the public computable injective map. The relation sampling
algorithm outputs a relation (x, y = F(ek, x)). The inversion algorithm takes in the trapdoor
and the image y = F(ek, x), outputs x.
Instantiations of TLTDR. Following the instantiation of TLTDF under the DDH assumption
and the instantiation of LTDR [28], we give an efficient instantiation under the DDH assumption
by relaxing evaluation algorithm into relation sampling algorithm. We constructs the TLTDR
by using 2× 3 matrix encryption. The function indexes in the injective mode and in the lossy
mode of TLTDR are
C0 =
(
gr1 gr1s1 gr1s2
gr2 gr2s1 gr2s2
)
,C1 =
(
gr1 gr1s1g gr1s2
gr2 gr2s1 gr2s2g
)
For C = (cij)2×3 and (x1, x2) ← Z2p, the relation sampling algorithm outputs a relation
(x = (gx1 , gx2), F(ek,x) =(cx111c
x2
21 , c
x1
12c
x2
22 , c
x1
13c
x2
23)). The combining algorithm computes x by
taking as input any t inversion shares and the image F(ek,x). It is not hard to show a collection
of (n, t, 2 log p, log p)-TLTDRs under the DDH assumption.
Table 1. Comparisons Among TPKE Schemes
Scheme pk size ciphertext size Enc Dec assumption
adaptive generic
IND-CCA
corruption construction
BD10 d5 d2 1Mvp 1SS+1Mvp LWE × × ×
XXZ11 2nd3 log d 2nd2 log d 1SS+1OTS+nTBE 1InvLTDF LWE × √ √
BKP13 d2 log d d log d 1OTS + 2Mvp 1InvPSF LWE
√ × √
Ours1 d
2 log d d log d 1Mvp 1Mvp LWE
√ √ ×
Ours2 l
2|G| l|G| l2Exp 1Exp DDH √ √ ×
Ours3 6|G| 3|G| 6Exp 1Exp DDH √ √ ×
‡ n and d denotes the number of users and the dimension of lattice respectively. Mvp, SS, OTS, TBE, InvLTDF,
InvPSF and Exp denote the cost of a matrix-vector product, a secret sharing, a one-time signature, a tag-based
encryption, inverting an image of LTDF, sampling a preimage of preimage sampleable function and a modular
exponentiation respectively. We construct the scheme of Ours1 and Ours2 from TTDF where l denotes input
length of function and the scheme of Ours3 from TTDR.
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Table 2. Comparisons Among RPKE Schemes
Scheme pk size ciphertext size assumption
adaptive generic
IND-CCA
corruption construction
NP00 |G| t|G| DDH √ × ×
DF03 (t+ 2)|G| 2(t+ 1)|G| DDH √ × √
Wee11 t|G| (t+ 2)|G| DDH × √ √
Wee11 t|Z∗N | (t+ 2)|Z∗N | factoring ×
√ √
Ours3 6|G| (2t+ 3)|G| DDH √ √ ×
Ours2 l
2|G| (2t+ l)|G| DDH √ √ ×
Ours1 d
2 log d d log d LWE
√ √ ×
‡ t and d denote the threshold value and the dimension of lattice, respectively. We construct the scheme of Ours1
and Ours2 from TTDF where l denotes input length of function and the scheme of Ours3 from TTDR.
9 Performance Evaluations
9.1 Theoretical Analysis
Communication Cost and Efficiency Comparison. Table 1 compares the communication
costs and computational costs of our lattice-based TPKE schemes with that in [16], [18], [19].
For lattice-based TPKE, the communication cost of our scheme is less than [16], in which they
need to use a large modulus which causes larger ciphertexts. Compared with [18], they split
the message into many pieces and encrypt every piece by a different tag-based encryption, that
cause the size of the public key and the ciphertext is at least linear in the number of users, while
our scheme splits the master secret key directly and shows the size of the public key and the
ciphertext is independent of the number of users. What’s more, the computational cost of our
TPKE is also less than [16], [18], [19], especially during the encryption and decryption phase, our
TPKE scheme only requires to compute a simple matrix-vector product respectively. However,
in [16], the decryption algorithm requires every user computes a sharing by a pseudorandom
secret sharing and a matrix-vector product. In [18], the encryption algorithm needs to run a
secret sharing scheme to split a message into n pieces, n times tag-based encryption to encrypt
every piece and a one-time signature. Moreover, the decryption algorithm require to check the
signature and invert an image of lossy trapdoor function to obtain a decryption share. Compared
with [19], their encryption algorithm requires every user runs a one-time signature and compute
twice matrix-vector product, and the decryption algorithm needs to run the inversion algorithm
of preimage sampleable function [20].
Table 2 compares the communication costs of our RPKE schemes with that in [8], [10], [9].
The size of the public key of our DDH-based RPKE is a 2 × 3 matrix which is less than [10]
and [9] in which the size of the public key is at least linear with the revocation threshold
value. Besides, our RPKE scheme is based on the LWE assumption, while the existing RPKE
schemes [8], [10], [9] are based on the number-theoretic assumptions.
9.2 Experimental Analysis
In order to evaluate the practical performance of our schemes, we implement the TTDF in
Section 3, TPKE in Section 4 and RPKE in Section 5 based on the NTL library. The program
is executed on an Intel Core i7-2600 CPU 3.4GHz and 4GB RAM running Linux Deepin 15.4.1
64-bit system.
Experiment Setting and Computation Time. As depicted in Table 3 and Table 4, we
set the security parameter λ = 128, 256, 512 respectively, and the dimension of lattice d =
20
512, 768, 1024 respectively and compute other parameter by the Section 7, where h = dc3 ,
c3 > 1, p = h
c1 , c1 > 0, l = ⌊lg p⌋, w = m = h/l, α ≤ 1/(32ph) and q > 2
√
d/α. What’s more,
we set the number of users9 is n = 4 and the threshold value is t = 3 in TPKE, and the number
of revoked users is r = 2 in RPKE.
As depicted in Table 3 and Table 4, we show the average running times of all algorithms
in our TPKE and RPKE schemes. For different security levels, we set the security parameter
λ = 128, 256, 512 respectively. The average running times of all algorithms in both DDH-based
TPKE and RPKE are the level of milliseconds. Therefore, our schemes are efficient and practical.
Meanwhile, we set the dimension of lattice d = 512, 768, 1024 respectively. In LWE-based TPKE
scheme, the average running times of the encryption algorithm and the decryption algorithm
are 0.076s, 0.167s, 0.293s, and 0.005s, 0.012s, 0.021s. In LWE-based RPKE scheme, the average
running times of the encryption algorithm are 0.092s, 0.209s, 0.382s. From these outcomes, we
note that the encryption algorithm and the decryption algorithm of our TPKE schemes and
the encryption algorithm of our RPKE schemes are efficient.
Table 3. Experiment Setting and Computation Time of DDH-Based TPKE and RPKE
Parameter TPKE Time (ms) RPKE Time (ms)
λ n t r KeyGen Encrypt Decrypt Combine KeyGen Encrypt Decrypt
128 4 3 2 2.184 0.263 0.145 0.309 4.978 0.390 0.467
256 4 3 2 9.499 0.517 0.312 0.566 11.59 0.839 0.770
512 4 3 2 68.08 1.311 0.797 1.318 34.53 1.890 1.786
‡ λ, n, t and r indicate the security parameter, the number of users, the threshold value, and the number of
revoked users, respectively.
Table 4. Experiment Setting and Computation Time of LWE-Based TPKE and RPKE
Parameter TPKE Time (s) RPKE Time (s)
d h p w n t r KeyGen Encrypt Decrypt Combine KeyGen Encrypt Decrypt
512 2200 2063 200 4 3 2 2.178 0.076 0.005 2.273 2.299 0.092 2.146
768 3260 6029 280 4 3 2 4.451 0.167 0.012 8.949 4.215 0.209 9.032
1024 4420 9859 340 4 3 2 7.724 0.293 0.021 17.554 7.367 0.382 17.962
‡ d, h, p, w, n, t and r indicate the dimension of lattice, the number of rows of matrix A of the public key, the
size of the message space Zp, the number of columns of matrix Z of the master secret key, the number of users,
the threshold value, and the number of revoked users, respectively.
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